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A CONSTITUTIONALTWILIGHT ZONE: EU DECENTRALIZED
AGENCIES’ EXTERNAL RELATIONS
MERIJN CHAMON*
Abstract
Even though EU agencies are poorly embedded in the EU’s constitutional
framework their proliferation continues. If and when these agencies
establish relations with international counterparts, they sometimes also
conclude arrangements or agreement with those counterparts.This brings
together two constitutionally problematic issues: the EU’s external action
and the limits to the empowerment of EU agencies. This article aims to
identify the constitutional and positive law frameworks applying to EU
agencies’external action, and looks at a number of examples. It is shown
how the positive law framework does not properly reflect the requirements
of EU constitutional law, resulting in legal ambiguity and accountability
problems. Some EU agencies seem to go beyond what is allowed under the
positive and constitutional law frameworks.
1. Introduction
EU decentralized agencies1 occupy a peculiar position in the EU’s
institutional framework: they have become a vital part of the EU machinery
yet the possibility to establish and empower them is as such not provided for
under the Treaties.2 While national systems may be confronted with a similar
problem when independent authorities that are not foreseen under the national
* Merijn Chamon is Assistant Professor of EU Law at Maastricht University. The author
would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and Andrea Ott for their valuable comments. All
errors or omissions remain his own.
1. An official definition of EU decentralized agencies is lacking, also following the
Common Approach on Decentralized Agencies. The EU Interinstitutional Style Guide lists the
bodies considered to be “decentralized organizations (agencies)” but does still not reflect a
genuine interinstitutional understanding; see section 9.5.3 of the Interinstitutional Style Guide.
The working definition used here defines them as permanent bodies under EU public law,
established by the institutions through secondary law and endowed with their own legal
personality. See Chamon, EU Agencies: Legal and Political Limits to the Transformation of
the EU Administration (OUP, 2016), p. 10.
2. See Mendes, “The EU Administration” in Kuijper et al., The Law of the European Union
and the European Communities (Kluwer Law International, 2018), p. 309.
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constitution are established,3 this issue acquires accrued legal significance for
the EU, since the EU, unlike States, is constrained in its functioning by the
principle of conferred powers. This principle is mainly known for its material
dimension, i.e. prescribing that the EU can only legislate on matters for which
competence has been conferred on it. However, the principle also has an
institutional dimension. In organizational terms, it results in an institutional
system that is more rigid than that of a State.4 Indeed, at least originally, the
EEC’s organizational structure was conceived as being “intended to be
unalterable”5 since no specific competence had been conferred on the
institutions to tinker with the institutional set-up. This links with the EEC (and
EU) Treaties’ character as traités cadres: when the Treaty authors restrict
themselves to setting rather abstract objectives which need to be progressively
realized by the EU institutions, the way in which the Treaty authors define the
institutional architecture and decision-making becomes of constitutional
significance.
However, in light of the institutional reality of agencification, this
“originalist” view on the possibility to supplement the EU’s institutional
set-up and to confer powers on newly created entities has given way to a more
pragmatic view.6 In this, the ECJ has played its part as well. In ENISA it
accepted that EU bodies with their own legal personality could be established
pursuant to Article 114 TFEU,7 despite it seeming difficult to qualify the
establishment of an EU body as a “measure for the approximation of national
laws”.8 In Short-selling it formally relaxed the standard that applies when the
3. See Halberstam, “The promise of comparative administrative law: A constitutional
perspective on independent agencies” in Rose-Ackerman and Lindseth (Eds.), Comparative
administrative law (Edward Elgar, 2010), pp. 185–204.
4. Everling, “Zur Errichtung nachgeordneter Behörden der Kommission der Europäischen
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft” in Hallstein and Schlochauer (Eds.), Zur Integration Europas
(Müller, 1965), p. 65.
5. Bertram, “Decision-making in the E.E.C.: The management committee procedure”, 5
CML Rev. (1968), 255. Of course a genuine consensus on this was lacking. Around the same
time as Bertram, Pescatore noted that current Art. 352 TFEU allowed the Council to “prendre
même des dispositions de caractère organique, en vue de créer des organismes nouveaux dans
le cadre de la structure institutionnelle”. See Pescatore, L’ordre juridique des Communautés
européennes: Etude des sources du droit communautaire (Presses Universitaires de Liège,
1975), p. 137.
6. For a more elaborate account of the legal change of heart, see Chamon, op. cit. supra note
1, pp. 192–207.
7. Case C-217/04, UK v. Parliament & Council (ENISA), EU:C:2006:279.
8. The Court thus treated the institutional question as incidental to the question whether the
tasks entrusted to ENISA were sufficiently linked to the harmonization measures which did
approximate national law.
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legislature confers powers on such bodies.9 While not as lenient as the
intelligible principle that applies in US constitutional law,10 it still marked a
watershed compared to theMeroni standard11 that was hitherto held to apply
to delegations to EU agencies.
Of course, this does not mean that the constitutional question of the position
and function of EU decentralized agencies has been settled; it remains very
much contested. From an EU law perspective, this contribution will focus
specifically on one often overlooked area of the EU agencies’ activities,12 i.e.
the external relations which these bodies have established with international
and third country counterparts. The constitutional challenges which
agencification poses are especially acute here,13 since in the area of external
relations the “institutional balance” itself is already much contested between
the EU institutions.14 Adding agencies to the equation adds a further
dimension to this: to what extent can agencies develop any external action
given that the typical agency mandate focuses on delivering policy output
9. Case C-270/12, UK v. Parliament & Council (Short-selling), EU:C:2014:18. One could
argue that the Court simply followed or sanctioned legislative practice as it had developed, but
still then the Court relaxed the standard by bringingMeroni in line with this developed practice.
On how the standard resulting from Short-selling is more lenient than the original Meroni
doctrine, see Chamon, “Les agences de l’union européenne origines, état des lieux et défis”, 51
CDE (2015), 308.
10. For a recent contribution on this principle in US constitutional law, see Edwards,
“Who’s exercising what power: Toward a judicially-manageable nondelegation doctrine”, 68
Administrative Law Review (2016), 1–92.
11. Case 9/56,Meroni v. High Authority, EU:C:1958:7.
12. See however Groenleer and Gabbi, “Regulatory agencies of the European Union as
international actors: Legal framework, development over time and strategic motives in the case
of the European Food Safety Authority”, 4 EJRR (2013), 479–492; Coman-Kund, European
Union Agencies as Global Actors (Universitaire Pers Maastricht, 2015); Ott, Vos and
Coman-Kund, “EU agencies and their international mandate: A new category of global
actors?”, CLEER Working Papers 7 (2013).
13. In this regard it may also be noted that the Commission’s Vademecum on the EU’s
external action seems almost completely oblivious of the existence of EU agencies. Only when
it comes to the EEAS representing the EU in (sub)committees at official level does the
Vademecum provide that the EEAS will coordinate its preparations “with all relevant
Commission services and any other relevant EU bodies (e.g. agencies, other institutions, etc.)”.
See SEC(2011)881, p. 23.
14. Just to illustrate, the post-Lisbon inter-institutional disputes in the area of external
relations brought before the ECJ pursuant to Art. 263 TFEU are the following: Case C-130/10,
Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2012:472; Case C-137/12, Commission v. Council, EU:C:
2013:675; Case C-377/12, Commission v. Council, EU:C:2014:1903; Case C-658/11,
Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2014:2025; Case C-114/12, Commission v. Council, EU:C:
2014:2151; Joined Cases C-103 & 165/12, Parliament and Commission v. Council, EU:C:
2014:2400; Case C-28/12, Commission v. Council, EU:C:2015:282; Case C-425/13,
Commission v. Council, EU:C:2015:483; Case C-73/14, Council v. Commission, EU:C:
2015:663; Case C-263/14, Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2016:435; Case C-660/13,
Commission v. Council, EU:C:2016:616; Case C-389/15, Commission v. Council,
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within the EU? Is there scope at all for agency external action in light of the
policy prerogative of the Council (pursuant to Art. 16 TFEU) and the external
representation prerogative of Commission (pursuant to Art. 17 TFEU),
prerogatives which are reflected and concretized in Article 218 TFEU? What
kind of external action can agencies develop, taking into account the
delegation limits that generally apply to them and which (a fortiori) should
also apply to their external dealings? Finally to what extent does the actual
external action developed by the EU agencies respect the framework that may
be deduced from the constitutional rules governing both the EU’s external
relations generally and agencification specifically?
The analysis in the following sections will show that the positive law
framework governing EU agencies’ external relations (identified in section 4)
is fragmented, excessively differentiated, and incomplete. It is fragmented
because it is spread over binding and non-binding documents that have not all
been published. It is excessively differentiated because the precise
requirements vary from one agency to the next without good reasons for this
heterogeneity.15 It is also incomplete since it does not fully reflect the
requirements that can be deduced from the relevant constitutional principles
(identified in section 3). Section 5 will show that the resulting ambiguity as to
the concrete rules governing agency external action is legally and politically
unsatisfactory, since it facilitates agency slippage,16 creating problems of
accountability and legitimacy, and has resulted in (or at least contributed to)
some EU agencies having concluded potentially problematic agreements with
third country counterparts or international organizations.
2. EU agencies and the external dimension
In the external relations of EU agencies, a distinction should be made between
two different activities. Thus, EU agencies may themselves be forums for
international cooperation when third countries or international organizations
participate in their activities (inward external relations). A different
constellation is if EU agencies establish relations with third countries or
EU:C:2017:798; Case C-687/15, Commission v. Council, EU:C:2017:803; Case C-244/17,
Commission v. Council, EU:C:2018:662; Joined Cases C-626/15 & C-659/16, Commission v.
Council, EU:C:2018:925.
15. Of course, some differentiation is necessary and justifiable, see infra note 116.
16. Kassim and Menon, “The principal-agent approach and the study of the European
Union: Promise unfulfilled?”, 10 Journal of European Public Policy (2003), 122.
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international organizations (outward external relations). This contribution
will focus only on the latter.17
As far as the rationale for the EU agencies’ external relations goes, there are
no EU agencies which have external cooperation as their core mandate.
Instead, EU agencies are established to secure the proper implementation of
the EU acquis internally. This means that EU agencies will only pursue
external activities insofar as this is necessary to realize their internal EU
objectives. Whether EU agencies are engaged externally thus depends on
whether this is useful or necessary to realize their internal mandate.18 To
illustrate: an agency like Frontex could in theory fulfil its mission of
supporting the Member States in securing the EU’s external borders without
developing any external relations. Clearly, though, it will do a much better job
in doing so if it establishes, and subsequently formalizes, cooperative relations
with the EU’s neighbours through administrative agreements or
arrangements. Conversely, the European Agency for Safety and Health at
Work has been established to provide EU actors with scientific and technical
information in the field of safety and health at work in order to improve the
working environment. To realize its mission, it does not seem that useful to
conclude arrangements or agreements with third countries, although it does
evidently entertain contacts with organizations such as the International
Labour Organization.
This possibility of EU agencies entering into administrative agreements or
arrangements19 raises the question of the nature of such texts.At least from the
perspective of international law, the species of administrative agreements does
not exist.20 Instead these are proper treaties in the sense of Article 2(1)(a) of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) or,21 depending on the
17. For a discussion of the European Economic Area Member States’ participation in EU
agencies, see Bekkedal, “Third State participation in EU agencies: Exploring the EEA
precedent”, 56 CML Rev. (2019), 381–416. Another form of inward external relations are the
EU Member States with opt-outs that have (partially) opted in in some of the EU agencies, but
these will not be further discussed either.
18. As Mendes notes “[i]nternational regulatory cooperation between agencies may
constitute a necessary condition for the effective performance of their tasks”. See Mendes, op.
cit. supra note 2, p. 312.
19. As Bartelt and Ott note, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, a
trend (in the Commission’s practice) may be witnessed whereby a distinction is made between
binding agreements and non-binding arrangements. See Bartelt and Ott, “Die
Verwaltungszusammenarbeit der Europäischen Kommission mit Drittstaaten und
internationalen Organisationen: Kategorisierung und rechtliche Einordnung”, 51 Europarecht
(2016), Beiheft, 157. This terminological distinction will also be used in this contribution.
20. Opinion of A.G. Tesauro in Case C-327/91, France v. Commission (I), EU:C:1993:941,
para 22.
21. Morrison, “Executive agreements” inMaxPlanck Encyclopedia of Public International
Law (2007), para 2.
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absence of an intention to be bound,22 non-binding arrangements. On whether
such administrative agreements may indeed be binding, the positions in the
academic debate seem to oscillate between accepting the binding character of
administrative agreements (insofar as this is clear from the text of the
agreement)23 and a certain denial of the relevance of the question, by noting
that administrative cooperation is typically not formalized in legal
commitments so as not to ossify the cooperation and because, in any event, the
interests of the different administrations typically run parallel.24 The
distinguishing feature of these agreements, i.e. what makes them
“administrative”, is purely internal since they are concluded pursuant to a
simplified procedure under domestic law (i.e. without parliamentary
approval) and/or by State departments without passing through the ordinary
diplomatic channels (typically the ministry of foreign affairs).25 From an EU
perspective then, any agreement that has not been negotiated and concluded
pursuant to Articles 218 or 219 TFEU is an administrative agreement. The
very pragmatic approach which international law takes to the issue is also
apparent in Article 7 of the 1969 VCLT which provides that agencies can also
bind their States despite lacking full powers if “[i]t appears from the practice
of the States concerned or from other circumstances that their intention was to
consider that person as representing the State for such purposes and to
dispense with full powers.” A virtually identical provision features in the 1986
VCLT. In terms of international responsibility, which of course is a separate
question, it follows from the Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) and the Articles on the
Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO) that States and
international organizations are responsible for the acts (even if ultra vires) of
22. Fitzmaurice, “Treaties” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law
(2010), para 17.
23. Vierdag, “De praktijk van de zogenoemde ‘Internationale Administratieve Akkoorden”
in Recht (Ed.), Spanningen tussen Recht en Praktijk in het Verdragenrecht (Libresso, 1989), p.
48; Benchendikh, “Le régime juridique des arrangements administratifs”, 7DroitAdministratif
(2005), para 11.
24. Virally, “La distinction entre textes internationaux de portée juridique et textes
internationaux dépourvus de portée juridique”, 60 Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international
(1983), 290.
25. Vierdag, op. cit. supra note 23, p. 42. On administrative agreements concluded by EU
Member States, see Ott, “The EU Commission’s administrative agreements: ‘Delegated
treaty-making’ in between delegated and implementing rule-making” in Tauschinsky and Weiß
( Eds.), The Legislative Choice Between Delegated and ImplementingActs in EU Law:Walking
a Labyrinth (Edward Elgar, 2018), p. 211. On executive agreements in the US, see Bodansky
and Spiro, “Executive agreements+”, 49 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2016),
885–930.
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their agencies acting in an official capacity.26 International law thus refers
back to the mandate of the agencies as defined in EU law, requiring us to look
into the internal EU rules on the agencies’ external relations.
In the following sections this contribution will identify the framework
governing the EU agencies’ outward external relations in both deductive and
inductive fashion. First, concrete rules will be deduced from the relevant
general constitutional principles. Subsequently the positive law framework
will be construed from institutional practice as it results from relevant
inter-institutional agreements (IIA) and secondary law adopted by the EU
institutions.
3. The constitutional framework governing the EU agencies’
external relations
The general constitutional principles that are of specific relevance will be
shown to be the principle of institutional balance and the non-delegation
doctrine resulting from Short-selling. It will be argued that all other relevant
principles can be largely subsumed under these two general principles.
However, before unpacking these two principles, it is necessary to clarify their
mutual relationship, given that the two are often conflated when they are
applied to the EU agencies (see also below). While the nature and function of
the institutional balance is still being debated,27 it is assumed here to be a
genuine principle of EU law, the function of which is to protect the systemic
integrity of the EU.28 While no single institutional balance exists,29 the
institutional balance in a specific area of EU law assigns competences to
specific institutions in order to concretely realize the objectives of the EU in
that area, given the traité cadre nature of the EU Treaties.30 As a result, it may
26. See Art. 4 ARSIWA and Arts. 6 & 8 ARIO. According to the commentary on the draft
articles, “[t]his wording is intended to convey the need for a close link between the ultra vires
conduct and the organ’s or agent’s functions”. See Yearbook of the International Law
Commission (2011), Vol. II, part 2, p. 60.
27. For an overview of this debate see Johnson, “The institutional balance as an agent of
transformation in the EU constitutional order: Reconciling the simultaneous rise of the
European Parliament and European agencies”, 6Cambridge International Law Journal (2017),
206–207; Chamon, op. cit. supra note 1, pp. 268–287; Bartelt and Ott, op. cit. supra note 19.
28. See Le Bot, Le principe de l’équilibre institutionnel en droit de l’union européenne
(Université Panthéon-Assas, 2012), PhD Thesis, p. 243.
29. See Chamon, “Institutional balance and Community method in the implementation of
EU legislation following the Lisbon Treaty”, 53 CML Rev. (2016), 1503–1504.
30. On the link between the EU Treaties’ quality as traités cadres and the principle of
institutional balance, see Koutrakos, “Institutional balance and sincere cooperation in
treaty-making under EU law”, 68 ICLQ (2019), 6.
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be argued that the institutional balance does not merely turn on the
prerogatives of the institutions concerned, but also on their duty to further the
EU’s objectives. In contrast, the non-delegation doctrine of the Short-selling
ruling goes back to theMeroni doctrine, which is concerned with the question
of ensuring continued political and judicial control over the exercise of
(delegated) public authority by subsidiary bodies.31 What are the precise
requirements flowing from these principles for the agencies’ external
relations?
3.1. Institutional balance
Post-Lisbon, Article 13(2) TEU “reflects the principle of institutional balance,
characteristic of the institutional structure of the European Union.”32 As noted
by Hillion, Article 13(2) TEU actually brings together different structural
principles that govern both the demarcation and exercise of powers.33 There is
the strict idea of conferral,34 i.e. an institution cannot exercise a power without
a competence;35 the specific idea of institutional balance, i.e. in exercising its
powers an institution must not negatively affect the prerogatives of another
institution;36 and the idea of sincere cooperation, i.e. a duty to ensure that the
(other) institutions and the decision-making procedures as prescribed by the
Treaties can continue to fulfil their Treaty ordained functions.37 While the
principle of institutional balance as worded in Article 13(2) TEU suggests that
it only applies between the EU institutions, it is clear that its scope of
application should be all-encompassing to ensure that it may fulfil its systemic
31. See Chamon, “Beyond delegated and implementing acts: Where do EU agencies fit in
the Article 290 and 291 scheme?” in Weiß and Tauschinsky (Eds.), The Legislative Choice
between Delegated and Implementing Acts in EU Law (Edward Elgar, 2018), p. 184.
32. Case C-409/13, Council v. Commission, EU:C:2015:217, para 64.
33. Hillion, “Conferral, cooperation and balance in the institutional framework of EU
external action” in Cremona (Ed.), Structural Principles in EU External Relations Law (Hart,
2018), p. 126.
34. Koutrakos as well notes that “the principle of institutional balance encapsulates … the
institutional implications of the principle of conferral”. See Koutrakos, op. cit. supra note 30, 4.
35. Competence in absence of power being ineffective and power in absence of competence
being illegal, see Constantinesco, Compétences et pouvoirs dans les Communautés
européennes: contribution à l’étude de la nature juridique des communautés (LGDR, 1974),
pp. 82–83.
36. Hillion, op. cit. supra note 33, p. 145.
37. Ibid., pp. 151–152. In this regard, Koutrakos notes that institutional balance (in the strict
sense) and the principle of sincere cooperation “amount to an indissoluble whole” under Art.
13(2) TEU. See Koutrakos, op. cit. supra note 30, 6.
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protection function. Not only would it therefore apply to other EU bodies such
as agencies,38 but also to the Member States.
The principle of institutional balance thus not only restricts the EU
institutions when they establish and empower EU agencies (i.e. the process of
agencification itself) but it also restricts the EU agencies in what they can do
when exercising the powers conferred on them. In terms of conferral, the
principle requires that the external action of EU agencies is foreseen (whether
explicitly or implicitly) in the agency’s mandate as defined in the agency’s
establishing act. Since, for the present purposes, the principle of conferred
powers can thereby be largely subsumed under the principle of institutional
balance, it need not be treated as a separate limit.39 The other two limbs of
institutional balance subsequently apply to the agencies in the exercise of their
powers in which they have to respect both a negative and a positive obligation:
one ensuring that they do not encroach on or negatively affect the powers of the
institutions proper and another, pursuant to the sincere cooperation limb,
ensuring that they facilitate the institutions in pursuing their Treaty ordained
tasks.
Applied to the area of EU external relations, where no lex specialis applies
for the EU agencies as it does for the ECB,40 this means that EU agencies may
not affect the prerogative of the Council to determine the (external) policy of
the Union and to authorize the opening of negotiations and the signature and
conclusion of agreements on behalf of the EU (cf. Art. 218(2) TFEU). In the
France v. Commission cases41 ITLOS42 and Swiss Memorandum43 the ECJ
38. Hillion, op. cit. supra note 33, p. 173. While the three agencies active in the CFSP
provide a specific case that will not be further addressed here, it should be noted that the
principle of institutional balance also applies to them although the specific institutional balance
in the area of CFSP (former 2nd Pillar) is of course completely different from the institutional
balance in the area of external relations under the former 1st Pillar.
39. This is in fact only different for those bodies forming part of the EU’s “second
organizational layer” whose mandate is (partially) foreseen in the Treaties themselves, thereby
taking it outside the reach of the EU institutions. According to Hilf, a distinction may indeed be
made between the primary, secondary and tertiary organizational layers of the EU, i.e. the
bodies created by the Treaties, the bodies foreseen but not created by the Treaties, and the
bodies not created nor foreseen by the Treaties. See Hilf, Die Organisationsstruktur der
Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Springer Verlag, 1982), p. 4. As noted above, most EU
decentralized agencies form part of the EU’s tertiary organizational layer, only Europol,
Eurojust, the European Defence Agency and the European Public Prosecutor being foreseen in
the Treaties.
40. While Art. 218 TFEU gives specific expression to the general institutional balance in
EU external relations, Art. 219 TFEU provides for specific rules (and a specific role for the
ECB) in relation to agreements in the area of monetary cooperation.
41. Case C-327/91, France v. Commission (I); Case C-233/02, France v. Commission (II),
EU:C:2004:173.
42. Case C-73/14, Council v. Commission (ITLOS), EU:C:2015:663.
43. Case C-660/13, Council v. Commission (Swiss Memorandum), EU:C:2016:616.
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protected this prerogative from encroachment by the Commission, but
evidently this applies a fortiori to the EU agencies as well. Here Bartelt and
Ott note that the Council can still delegate the power44 to conclude
administrative agreements to the Commission in secondary law or in an
international agreement itself.45 This may be applied mutatis mutandis to the
EU agencies, albeit that such a delegation should also conform to the
non-delegation doctrine (see further below) and should in addition be
scrutinized in light of the prerogatives of the Commission and Parliament: by
conferring powers on the agencies, the Council cannot undermine the powers
which the Commission and Parliament would otherwise hold.
In terms of the Commission’s prerogatives, cases like ITLOS and Australia
emissions trading system demonstrate that the Commission has a prerogative
and duty to represent the EU to the outside world,46 which also includes a
prerogative to recommend opening negotiations and to negotiate on behalf of
the EU (cf. Art. 218(3) TFEU). Specifically, when the Commission negotiates
on behalf of the EU, the proper fulfilment of its tasks evidently requires the
agencies to abstain from giving binding instructions;47 or, less far-fetched
since it has already happened in the past, it precludes agencies from taking the
Commission’s seat in the EU delegation. The positive obligation resulting
from the sincere cooperation limb of institutional balance in addition requires
the agencies to assist the Commission when the latter represents the EU in
international fora (e.g. providing the Commission with expertise as part of the
EU delegation).
Finally, in light of the Court’s post-Lisbon case law on the role of the
Parliament in external relations, agencies also have to take into account the
Parliament’s prerogatives when engaging in external relations. These include
the prerogative to be fully informed and the prerogative to give or withhold
consent to certain agreements concluded on behalf of the EU (cf. Art.
218(6)(a) and 218(10) TFEU). Indeed in the Tanzania case the Court noted
that the:
44. The idea is that an authority’s competences are inalienable and that only the power to
exercise a competence can be delegated. See Gautier, La délégation en droit communautaire
(Strasbourg 3, 1995), PhD Thesis, p. 47.
45. Bartelt and Ott, op. cit. supra note 19, 152–157. In relation to the Commission, Bartelt
and Ott also cite Art. 220 TFEU, but obviously this legal basis cannot be invoked by the EU
agencies.
46. Tellingly, the ECJ ruled that while Art. 335 TFEU only explicitly envisages the
Commission representing the EU before national jurisdictions, this was merely an “expression
of a general principle that the European Union has legal capacity and is to be represented, to that
end, by the Commission”. See Case C-73/14, ITLOS, para 58.
47. As follows from Case C-425/13, Commission v. Council (Australia emissions trading
system), EU:C:2015:483, para 88.
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“participation by the Parliament in the legislative process is the reflection,
at Union level, of a fundamental democratic principle that the people
should participate in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a
representative assembly. As regards the procedure for negotiating and
concluding international agreements, the information requirement laid
down in Article 218(10) TFEU is the expression of that democratic
principle, on which the European Union is founded”.48
Thus, the specific requirement to fully inform the Parliament at all stages of
the procedure when international agreements are negotiated and concluded on
behalf of the Union is not self-standing, but merely gives expression to a more
fundamental principle.49 In institutional balance terms, informed by the
democratic principle, it can thus be argued that the Parliament has a
prerogative and duty to ensure democratic oversight. In terms of external
relations, Article 218(10) TFEU does not exhaustively settle the scope of this
oversight but merely makes it explicit in relation to the most significant type
of external action of the Union. Applied to the EU agencies, it could mean that
the Parliament also has a prerogative and duty to exercise democratic
oversight, requiring the agencies to keep the Parliament fully and immediately
informed of the (administrative) agreements or arrangements which they are
negotiating and concluding on behalf of the EU or in their own name.
In a nutshell, institutional balance requires the EU agencies to practice
sincere cooperation with the EU institutions and equally requires an explicit or
implied conferral of the power to engage in external action in secondary law.
If such a power is conferred on the agency, any agreements or arrangements
are concluded on behalf of the EU agency itself. The Council may also
delegate its power to act on behalf of the EU,50 in which case special attention
is required to ensure that the prerogatives of the Commission and Parliament
are safeguarded,51 otherwise the Council would be circumventing the
institutional balance transpiring from Article 218 TFEU.
48. Case C-263/14, Parliament v. Council (Tanzania), EU:C:2016:435, para 70.
49. The required involvement of the Parliament is even an essential procedural requirement,
violation of which results in the automatic invalidity of the measure in question. See Case
C-658/11, Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2014:2025, para 86.
50. It follows from Case C-233/02, France v. Commission II that it is immaterial here (for
institutional balance purposes) whether the agency’s action is binding or non-binding.
51. This is not to say that institutional balance concerns are only triggered when the agency
acts on behalf of the EU (rather than in its own name), instead institutional balance concerns
then become especially relevant.
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3.2. Non-delegation
The second major principle is the non-delegation doctrine enshrined in the
Meroni doctrine as re-interpreted in 2014 by the ECJ in the Short-selling case.
This principle is specific to EU agencies and must be assumed to apply to
them generally, regardless of whether they act internally or externally.
Following Short-selling, the Meroni doctrine requires the powers of EU
agencies to be “precisely delineated” instead of merely executive (as under the
original doctrine). Before looking into how the Court understands the notion
of “precisely delineated powers”, the question of the precise relationship
between the institutional balance and the Meroni doctrine should briefly be
returned to here. Since in the literature theMeroni doctrine is often conflated
with institutional balance, where the former is understood as a specific
expression of the latter, one could question whether theMeroni doctrine really
is a self-standing requirement. As noted above, equating both seems incorrect.
This may be illustrated with the following hypothetical example: underArticle
218(5) TFEU the Council is to authorize the signing of international
agreements negotiated by the Commission or the High Representative. The
question whether or not an agreement should be signed on behalf of the EU is
of course a highly political decision given the consequences of the act of
signing under international law.52 Arguably, however, once this political
decision is taken, the actual act of signing is purely executive and does not
imply the exercise of discretionary powers. Could the Council in this light
authorize an EU agency to sign the agreement on behalf of the EU? That
agency would act fully in line with theMeroni doctrine, exercising a precisely
delineated power. It seems clear, however, that such a Council decision would
still violate the institutional balance since it transpires from Title III TEU and
Article 218 TFEU that it is a prerogative of the High Representative or the
Commission to be authorized to sign agreements negotiated by them.
What then does it mean for powers to be “precisely delineated”? Arguably,
the following three requirements can be generalized from Short-selling: a
power may be said to be “precisely delineated” under that case law when
(i) the conferral of powers is exceptional, e.g. entrusting a task to an agency
may be justified in light of the technical nature of the task; (ii) the agency’s
powers are embedded in decision-making procedures involving other actors,
i.e. the agency should not be able to make decisions completely
autonomously; and (iii) the agency acts pursuant to pre-defined criteria.53
52. See Art. 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
53. See Chamon, “Granting powers to EU decentralized agencies, three years following
Short-selling”, 18 ERA Forum (2018), 600. Coman-Kund draws a different set of criteria from
Short-selling. They are not taken over because they integrate institutional balance concerns in
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Specifically for the EU agencies’ external relations this would require the EU
legislature, as a matter of ex ante control, to clearly set out for which reasons
and under which conditions agencies can conclude agreements or
arrangements with international counterparts. In the originalMeroni doctrine,
one further requirement was that a delegation may not be presumed, but has to
be made explicit.54 In Short-selling, the Court did not need to recall this
requirement, but it should arguably still apply, meaning that significant
external action such as the conclusion of agreements or arrangements should
be explicitly foreseen in an agency’s establishing act. The ongoing (political)
control prescribed by the second requirement must be complemented by (ex
post) judicial control exercised by the ECJ, but it should be clear that the Court
set a rather low threshold: applied to the EU agencies concluding
arrangements or agreements it would not require any of the political
institutions to exercise a veto power, a power of opinion being sufficient.
Finally, the first requirement that may be deduced from Short-selling can
also be seen to reflect a proportionality requirement. The general
proportionality principle that governs the content and form of all EU action
can thus be largely subsumed under the specific necessity requirement of the
re-interpreted Meroni doctrine. A principle which normally figures between
conferral and proportionality, but which is not taken over here as a separate
limit either, is subsidiarity. Not because it is irrelevant,55 but because
subsidiarity should already be addressed by the legislature when defining the
core mandate of the EU agency. If the core mandate is in line with subsidiarity,
and if the external activity of an agency is a (necessary) function of that core
mandate which respects the principle of proportionality, subsidiarity issues
should not arise.
3.3. Combining and enforcing the two principles
Any power conferred on or delegated to EU decentralized agencies therefore
needs to meet the Meroni requirements regardless of any additional
institutional balance concerns. As regards the latter, it is clear that in granting
the Meroni doctrine and because they still refer to the merely executive nature of agencies’
powers. See Coman-Kund, op. cit. supra note 12, p. 89.
54. Case 9/56,Meroni, p. 151.
55. On the relevance of subsidiarity in the EU’s external relations, see Bosse-Platière,
“L’application du principe de subsidiarité dans le cadre de l’action extérieure de l’Union
européenne” in Neframi and Gatti (Eds.), Constitutional Issues of EU External Relations Law
(Nomos, 2018), pp. 111–136; De Baere, “Subsidiarity as a structural principle governing the
use of EU external competences” in Cremona, op. cit. supra note 33, pp. 93–115.
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powers to EU agencies, an EU institution cannot encroach on the prerogatives
of another institution and neither can it divest itself of its prerogatives. A
complicating factor here, of course, is that the institutional balance may be
rather elusive, i.e. “it is not the sharp sword which would delineate with clarity
and in advance the limits of institutional powers.”56 The precise institutional
balance in any given area of EU law does not clearly transpire from the
Treaties, and instead it will be up to the Court to engage in a law-finding
exercise to define the institutional balance in an ad hoc manner. Short-selling
is a case in point whereby the ECJ effectively sanctioned the possibility for the
EU legislature to confer implementing powers in the sense of Article 291
TFEU on EU decentralized agencies.57 This was despite the fact that a natural
reading of Article 291 TFEU suggests that the implementation of EU law (at
least at EU level) is a prerogative of the Commission and the Council. While
the question of institutional balance was thereby neglected by the Court in
Short-selling, this shortcoming may be addressed, at least partially, by
incorporating institutional balance concerns in the first limb of the “precisely
delineated test” (cf. above): by ensuring that EU agencies are only
exceptionally empowered, the impact on the institutions’ prerogatives may be
limited or minimalized.
Under the constitutional framework, then, agencies could conclude both
agreements and arrangements with third country counterparts or international
organizations, as long as such a precisely delineated power is provided for in
their mandate, which the non-delegation doctrine would require to be done in
an explicit manner. Agencies should further exercise such power while
respecting the prerogatives of, and practising sincere cooperation with, the
institutions proper. That power will furthermore only be precisely delineated
when it is necessary for the agency to perform its main tasks and when it is
subject to political and judicial control,58 which implies that the agency acts
56. Koutrakos, op. cit. supra note 30, 6.
57. In Short-selling, the Court sidestepped this issue by postulating that the power conferred
on ESMA “does not correspond to any of the situations defined in Articles 290 TFEU and 291
TFEU” (Case Case C-270/12, Short-selling). However, it is difficult to qualify the ESMA’s
power under Art. 28 of Regulation 236/2012 as anything other than a de facto implementing
power under Art. 291 TFEU. See inter aliaBertrand, “La compétence des agences pour prendre
des actes normatifs; le dualisme des pouvoirs d’exécution”, (2015) RTDE, 28; Chamon,
“Beyond delegated and implementing acts: Where do EU agencies fit in the Article 290 and
291 scheme?” in Weiß and Tauschinsky, The Legislative Choice between Delegated and
Implementing Acts in EU Law (Edward Elgar, 2018), p. 186.
58. In light of the ECJ’s existing external relations case law it may be assumed that even if
an arrangement (i.e. a non-binding act) is at issue, the Court would still accept jurisdiction
under Art. 263 TFEU, as the act itself of exercising a presumed power results in legal effects,
since it creates, for the EU’s counterparts, an impression as to the EU division of competences.
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pursuant to predefined criteria and not in complete autonomy. The necessity
test could then further mean that agencies may only conclude arrangements
but no agreements, since agencies would never be required to legally commit
themselves (or the EU) in order to be able to fulfil their mandate.
If these are constitutional principles governing the EU agencies’ external
action, how may they be enforced against the agencies and possibly the EU
institutions when empowering the agencies? Since this is typically done
through formal legislative acts, only the privileged applicants will be able to
directly challenge the empowerments themselves.59 In addition,
non-privileged applicants will typically not be able to challenge the
agreements or arrangements concluded by the EU agencies either. The
non-binding arrangements will not produce any legal effects vis-à-vis natural
or legal persons, whereas any binding agreements might constitute regulatory
acts but will typically require implementing measures or will not concern
private parties individually and directly. If private parties would wish to
challenge the legality of these agreements, they will have to do so indirectly by
challenging either national implementing measures (upon which preliminary
questions may be referred to the ECJ) or EU implementing measures (upon
which an exception of illegality may be raised). On the contrary, the privileged
applicants will be able to directly challenge even non-binding arrangements if
they claim a violation of the institutional balance,60 given that “the Court has
in the past [in applications brought by privileged applicants] addressed
comparable substantive issues even where there were strong indications of
inadmissibility”.61 Contrary to actions brought by private parties,62 the ECJ
would probably be inclined to allow a case against an arrangement adopted by
an EU agency if it is brought by an EU institution or Member State claiming
that the agency overstepped its mandate or unlawfully arrogated powers to
itself.
See e.g. Opinion of A.G. Kokott in Joined Cases C-626/15 & C-659/16,Commission v.Council
(AMP Antarctique), EU:C:2018:362, para 66.
59. This since the legislative acts in question will typically not directly and individually
concern any private party.
60. See to this effect Case C-233/02, France v. Commission II, para 40; Case C-660/13,
Swiss Memorandum, para 36; Joined Cases C-8 & 10/15 P, Ledra Advertising et al, v.
Commission & ECB, EU:C:2016:701, para 59.
61. Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Case C-73/14, ITLOS, EU:C:2015:490, para 49.
62. In a case brought by private parties, the Court noted that all “act[s] of a[n] [EU]
institution, … carry an incidental implication that the institution in question has adopted a
position as to its competence to adopt them, that adoption of a position cannot itself be viewed
as a binding legal effect for the purposes of Article [263 TFEU]”. See Case C-131/03 P,
Reynolds Tobacco et al. v. Commission, EU:C:2006:541, para 66.
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4. The positive law framework governing the agencies’ external
relations
In how far is the framework identified above reflected in positive law? In order
to answer this question, the establishing regulations of the agencies need to
be read together with the 2012 Common Approach on DecentralizedAgencies
(a non-binding interinstitutional agreement)63 as well as the working
arrangements that have been concluded between the agencies and the
Commission.64
4.1. Prima facie lack of international legal personality of EU agencies
The very first question which arises is whether EU agencies enjoy
international legal personality (separate from that of the EU). Depending on
whether they do, a distinction would have to be made between instances when
agencies act under the EU umbrella while concluding administrative
agreements or arrangements, and when they act as separate subjects of
international law. The EU agencies’ establishing acts typically contain a
provision on their legal personality which reads: “The [agency] shall have
legal personality. It shall enjoy in all the Member States the most extensive
legal capacity accorded to legal persons under their laws.” In the regulations of
the agencies of the third wave,65 the nature of this legal personality is further
specified with the following provision: “It [the agency] may, in particular,
acquire or dispose of movable and immovable property and may be party to
legal proceedings.” While these provisions may at first sight be read as
conferring only legal personality under national law and EU law, without
immediate implications for their status in the international legal order,66 it
cannot a priori be excluded that they also confer legal personality under
international law.67 After all, a similar provision may be found in Article 308
TFEU in relation to the European Investment Bank the “partial capacity to
63. See <europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/joint_statement_and_
common_approach_2012_en.pdf>.
64. These working arrangements, foreseen by the Common Approach, are not made public.
Access was secured through “access to documents” requests pursuant to Regulation 1049/2001.
65. I.e. the agencies established from 2001 onwards.
66. Ruffert, “Personality under EU Law: A conceptual answer towards the pluralisation of
the EU”, 20 ELJ (2014), 358.
67. Note in this regard that the ECJ in ITLOS also interpreted Art. 335 TFEU and its
provision that “[i]n each of the Member States, the Union shall enjoy the most extensive legal
capacity accorded to legal persons under their law; it may … be a party to legal proceedings. To
this end, the Union shall be represented by the Commission” as indicative of the Commission’s
competence to represent the Union before international tribunals. See Case C-73/14, ITLOS,
para 58.
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enter into international relations [of] which is recognized by practice”.68
Nonetheless, this would only be the case if it can be shown that such
international legal personality is necessary for the agency to fulfil its mandate
and, subsequently, whether such personality is recognized by States or
whether it has effective power to partake in the creation of international law.69
What light does the practice of EU agencies’ external relations shed on this
question? The only agreements resembling proper international agreements
which the EU agencies have concluded are their headquarters agreements
with their respective host States.70 In line with the Common Approach these
are also the international agreements foreseen in the agencies’ establishing
regulations.71 Schusterschitz concludes from the headquarters agreements
that have been concluded that a large number of EU host States recognize the
international legal personality of the EU agency which they host.72 However,
Ott cautioned against taking this as proof of the international legal personality
of EU agencies, arguing that cumulative indications are required.73 A cautious
approach indeed seems in order, given the lack of any further treaty practice
and lack of clear recognition by non-EU States.74 Furthermore, the finalized
agreement for the orderly withdrawal of the UK from the EU75 undermines the
argument that an international legal personality for EU agencies may be
inferred from their practice of concluding headquarters agreements. Article
119 of the draft withdrawal agreement deals with the headquarters agreements
concluded by the UK and provides that the relevant agencies will be relocated
to the remaining Member States. As regards the termination of the
agreements, the article provides: “The date of notification by the Union of the
completion date of the relocation shall constitute the termination date of those
host agreements.” The fact that the EU might give notification of the
68. Ruffert, op. cit. supra note 66, 359.
69. Depending on whether one follows the “recognition conception” or the “actor
conception” of international legal personality, see Portmann, Legal Personality in International
Law (Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 80–84 & 213.
70. See Chamon, op. cit. supra note 1 pp. 93–97.
71. According to the Commission, “29 of the 33 existing decentralised agencies have
concluded headquarters agreements with their host Member States.” See Commission,
COM(2019) 187 final.
72. Schusterschitz, “European agencies as subjects of international law”, 1 International
Organizations Law Review (2004), 175.
73. Ott, “EU regulatory agencies in EU external relations: Trapped in a legal minefield
between European and international law”, 13 EFA Rev. (2008), 515–540.
74. See in contrast, the host agreement to which Seatzu and Pintus superfluously refer to
show how the international personality of the Organization Internationale de la Francophonie
has been recognized in practice. See Seatzu and Pintus, “L’organisation internationale de la
francophonie comme sujet du droit international public”, 93 Rev. dr. Int. dr. comp. (2016),
41–42.
75. See O.J. 2019, C 66I/1.
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termination instead of the agency itself suggests that headquarters agreements
are concluded by the agency on behalf of the EU, not on its own behalf.
Other than to headquarters agreements, the establishing regulations of
around half of the EU agencies refer to further types of instruments to
formalize the international relations of EU agencies, if such relations are at all
foreseen in the first place. The “administrative arrangements” or “working
arrangements” (the exact name differs from one agency to the next) suggest
that these acts are never intended to be binding. When a number of these
arrangements are analysed, this will be further verified (see below, section 5).
After all, if EU agencies’ capacity to conclude treaties is treated as that of
international organizations, their constituent instruments need not confer
international legal personality in an explicit manner,76 but it may also
transpire from their practice. First, however, the relevant provisions of both the
Common Approach and a selection of recently adopted or recast establishing
regulations will be assessed.
4.2. The common approach on decentralized agencies
To remedy the ad hoc approach to agencification, the EU institutions in 2012
adopted a set of guiding principles – a “Common Approach” – to make the EU
decentralized agencies’ governance and functioning more coherent, effective,
efficient and accountable.77 The Common Approach found its origins in the
2001 White Paper on Governance which suggested that the criteria for relying
on EU agencies and a framework for their functioning should be defined.78
The Commission’s proposal for a binding IIA establishing such a framework
failed to muster support in the Council.79 Formally, the Council argued that it
did not want to pre-empt future decisions of the legislature and its legal service
argued that there was no proper legal basis to establish such a framework.80 In
reality however, the Commission’s proposal was too supranational, and the
Council preferred the flexibility to follow an ad hoc approach.81 The fact that
76. Webb, “Treaties and international organizations: Uneasy analogies” in Tams,
Tzanakopoulos and Zimmerman (Eds.), Research Handbook on the Law of Treaties (Edward
Elgar, 2014), p. 570.
77. European Commission, “Breakthrough as EU institutions agree common approach on
agencies”, 13 June 2012, Press Release IP-12-604.
78. European Commission, “European Governance: A White Paper”, COM(2001)428
final.
79. For the proposal see European Commission, “Draft interinstitutional agreement on the
operating framework for the European regulatory agencies”, COM(2005)59 final.
80. Council of the European Union, “CLS Opinion on the Draft Interinstitutional
Agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory agencies”, Doc. 7861/05.
81. See Comte, “Agences européennes: relance d’une réflexion interinstitutionelle
européenne?”, (2008) Revue du Droit de l’Union Européenne, 487–488.
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the question of the legal basis does not seem to have been reconsidered in light
of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty is telling in this regard.82 The
Commission withdrew its proposal in 2008 and an interinstitutional working
group was instead established. The working group performed a horizontal
review of the agencies’ establishing acts and set out to define the non-binding
Common Approach (hereafter: CA) which was ultimately adopted in 2012.83
At the time, the CA was received rather critically.84 This was because it was
formally non-binding but especially because the document was disappointing
as to its substance. On most issues, the CA was a simple codification of
existing “best practices”, though it did not even taken into account the most
recent developments. Furthermore, certain vital issues are completely ignored
in the CA. For one, the CA on Decentralized Agencies fails to define what an
EU Decentralized Agency is. This means that the instrument meant to
rationalize EU agencification results in preliminary discussions between the
EU institutions on whether the CA should at all apply to a certain body the
establishment of which is under consideration.85 Secondly, the most hotly
debated issue in legal doctrine, the limits of agencies’ powers and theMeroni
doctrine, was ignored in the CA and left for the ECJ to tackle in Short-selling.
In contrast to this general reception of the CA, it must be noted that the
section devoted to the EU agencies’ external relations does contain novel and
elaborate requirements. It thus explicitly provides that agencies cooperating at
the international level should establish a strategy for their external relations in
their work programme.86 Moreover, the CA provides that working
arrangements with the relevant Commission Directorates General (DGs)
82. The Council Legal Service’s objection to Art. 352 TFEU as a legal basis should have
been reconsidered given that post-Lisbon Art. 352 TFEU provides for the consent of the
European Parliament. Similarly, the implications of the revamped Art. 295 TFEU should
arguably have been considered.
83. Comte, “Agences décentralisées: vers un statut unifié? Approche commune du
Parlement européen, du Conseil de l’Union européenne et de la Commission européenne sur les
agences décentralisées” in Govaere and Hanf (Eds.), Scrutinizing Internal and External
Dimensions of European Law – Les dimensions internes et externes du droit européen à
l’épreuve (Peter Lang, 2013), Vol. I, pp. 146–147.
84. See inter alia Scholten, “The newly released ‘common approach’ on EU agencies:
Going forward or standing still?”, (2012) CJEL online, <www.cjel.net/online/19_2-scholten>;
Bernard, “Accord sur les agences européennes: la montagne accouche d’une souris”, (2012)
Revue du Droit de l’Union Européenne.
85. See e.g. the disagreement between the Commission and a number of Member States on
the nature of the body proposed by the Commission in COM(2018)630 final.
86. See para 25 of the Common Approach, see link supra note 63. The agencies’ work
programmes are adopted by the Boards of the agencies and sent to the EU institutions for
information. Sometimes the Commission is formally involved in the adoption of the work
programme, see Chamon, op. cit. supra note 1, pp. 82–83.
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should ensure that agencies stay within their mandate.87 Most importantly, the
CA clarifies that agencies should not be seen as representing the EU or
committing the EU internationally.88 Finally, the CA aims to ensure the
consistency of the EU’s external policy by prescribing an early exchange of
information between the agency, the Commission and the Union
delegations.89
In light of the constitutional framework identified above, it therefore seems
clear that the non-binding CA gives expression to a concern for the principle
of institutional balance (second limb). By providing that EU agencies can
never act on behalf of the EU any institutional balance concerns are
pre-empted, since the prerogatives of the EU institutions as enshrined in
Article 218 TFEU are safeguarded. If an agency only acts on its own behalf, it
cannot thwart the prerogatives of the EU institutions. The early exchange of
information and the working arrangements reflect a duty of sincere
cooperation but only in relation to the Commission, not the other institutions.
Finally, the idea that agencies should stay within their mandate clearly reflects
the conferral limb of the principle of institutional balance. What is therefore
lacking in the CA are requirements reflecting the non-delegation doctrine
(which is unsurprising since, as mentioned above, the general issue of
delegation was also completely ignored in the CA) and a clear role for the
European Parliament. In addition, as will be further argued below, it is quite
problematic that a key issue such as ensuring that agencies stay within their
mandate, an issue that is further linked with the non-delegation doctrine, is left
to be regulated by the Commission in working arrangements that are not
pro-actively made public and that no enforcement means are provided to the
Commission to ensure agencies respect their mandates.90
4.3. Provisions in the establishing regulations
Horizontally screening the different regulations establishing EU decentralized
agencies reveals that most recognize an international dimension to the work of
87. See para 25 of the Common Approach.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. The early warning mechanism (see infra note 144) means that the Commission has to
rely on its power of persuasion vis-à-vis EU agencies. This is not ideal but may of course still
work, e.g. when the Commission threatened to use the mechanism to object to a draft
memorandum of understanding between the Single Resolution Board and its US counterpart
(cf. infra note 93) on which its legal service had advised negatively, see Note of the Legal
Service of 6 July 2017 addressed to the Deputy Director-General of the Directorate-General for
Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital markets Union (DG FISMA),
“Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the SRB and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC)”, Ares(2017)3405320.
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EU agencies, but of those that do, few contain provisions on instruments
through which the agencies’ external relations may be formalized.91 Crucially,
none provide a clear mandate to conclude agreements or arrangements on
behalf of the EU. While this possibility is allowed for under the constitutional
framework (see above), it has not been relied on by the legislature and instead
has been excluded by the institutions in the Common Approach.
The fact that few regulations prescribe the means through which EU
agencies can pursue external action already suggests that for most agencies
the legislature did not foresee any significant external action. For example,
Article 2(4)(h) of the EMSA regulation provides that one of the tasks of the
agency is to provide the:
“technical assistance necessary for the Member States and the
Commission to contribute to the relevant work of the technical bodies of
the IMO, the International Labour Organization as far as shipping is
concerned, and the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State
Control and relevant regional organizations to which the Union has
acceded, with regard to matters of Union competence.”92
While the EMSA could give such assistance in absence of this explicit clause,
it is clear that explicating this task of the EMSA is preferable. In institutional
balance terms as defined above, the agency’s role as envisaged in its
regulation is (solely?) restricted to assisting the Commission in the fulfilment
of its Treaty-ordained task to represent the EU’s interests on the international
plane. The fact that other agencies’ establishing regulations also contain
provisions on how those agencies can pursue their own external relations
may,93 a contrario, suggest that the EMSA is prohibited from doing so.
However, such an inference would be premised on the idea that the EU
legislature has been informed by a coherent and consistent view of the
agencies’ role and place in the EU institutional set-up. Unfortunately that has
not been the case, even following the Common Approach, as agencification
has largely developed in an ad hoc fashion.
Where the establishing regulations do contain provisions on how they may
pursue their external relations, a number of developments can be noted in
91. See the overview in Coman-Kund, op. cit. supra note 12, pp. 439–440.
92. See Regulation 1406/2002, O.J. 2002, L 208/1. Similarly, see Art. 23(j) of the EFSA
Regulation (178/2002) which is even more protective of the Commission’s prerogatives, since
it provides that any assistance by the EFSA has to be requested by the Commission.
93. One interesting example is the Single Resolution Board for which the establishing
regulation explicitly provides that it may conclude memoranda of understanding with third
country counterparts and that it may do so on behalf of the national resolution authorities of the
EU Member States participating in the Single Resolution Mechanism, see Art. 32 of Regulation
806/2014, O.J. 2014, L 225/1.
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recent years. Generally, the legislature is devoting greater attention to the issue
by introducing detailed requirements and omitting unhelpful vague limits. In
this regard, a clear concern on the part of the legislature may be noted in that
it explicitly aims to safeguard the EU’s and the Member States’ competence to
act externally. Secondly, the legislature seems increasingly intent on
explicating the link between the core mandate of the agencies and their
external action. Finally, the role of the EU institutions in controlling the
agencies in their external action also seems in flux.
For instance, the EASO, EASA and Frontex regulations provided that the
arrangements concluded by these agencies with third countries should be “in
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty” – without however
identifying these Treaty provisions.94 Following the revisions of the
establishing regulations, this enigmatic clause95 is being replaced with more
concrete and useful requirements.96
In terms of clauses that aim to protect the competences of the Member
States, the 2010 regulations establishing the financial authorities (ESAs)
introduced specific provisions which were later taken over in the ERA
regulation and (partially) in the regulations of the social agencies, the EASA
and the ACER. Since 2010, the following provisions have cropped up: the
agency may enter into arrangements “without prejudice to the respective
competences of the Member States and the Union institutions (including the
European External Action Service)”;97 “[t]hose arrangements shall not create
legal obligations in respect of the Union and its Member States”;98 such
94. See Art. 14 of the original Frontex Regulation (2007/2004); Art. 18(2) of the original
EASA regulation (1592/2002); Art. 49(2) of the original EASO regulation (439/2010).
95. According to Coman-Kund the “relevant provisions of the Treaty” are the material basis
on which the agency has been established and Art. 218 TFEU. See Coman-Kund, op. cit. supra
note 12, p. 202.
96. This clause no longer figures in the recast Frontex and EASA regulations. Pursuant to
the Commission proposal to update the EASO regulation (COM(2016)271) the clause would
also be taken out of the EASO regulation.
97. See Arts. 33 of the ESAs regulations (1093/2010; 1094/2010; 1095/2010); Art. 19 of
the wholesale energy market regulation (1227/2011); Art. 44(1) of the new ERA regulation
(2016/796); Art. 30(1) of the new EU-OSHA regulation (2019/126); Art. 30(1) of the new
Eurofound regulation (2019/127); Art. 29(1) of the new Cedefop regulation (2019/128). Only
the regulations for the ACER and ERA also refer to the EEAS’ competences.
98. See Arts. 33 of the ESAs regulations (1093/2010; 1094/2010; 1095/2010); Art. 19 of
the wholesale energy market regulation (1227/2011); Art. 34(5) of the CEPOL Regulation
(2015/2219); Art. 23(3) of the Europol regulation (2016/794); Art. 44(2) of the new ERA
regulation (2016/796); Art. 99(3) of the EPPO Regulation (2017/1939); Art. 90(2) of the new
EASA regulation (2018/1139); Art. 47(3) of the Eurojust regulation (2018/1727) Art. 30(1) of
the new EU-OSHA regulation (2019/126); Art. 30(1) of the new Eurofound regulation
(2019/127); Art. 29(1) of the new Cedefop regulation (2019/128); Art. 39(1) of the 2017
ENISA proposal. In the Commission’s proposal for the wholesale energy market regulation
(COM(2010)726 final) this provision was not foreseen.
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arrangements “shall not prevent Member States and their competent
authorities from concluding bilateral or multilateral arrangements with
international organizations and the administrations of third countries”.99
These provisions give expression to the concern that is also central to the
Common Approach, namely: ensuring that whatever EU agencies do, they
cannot be seen to bind the EU or the Member States and do not take over the
external relations’ functions of the institutions proper. In addition, the third
provision precludes the possibility of an ERTA effect flowing from the
administrative arrangements concluded by EU agencies.This clarification has
acquired special relevance following the Court’s decision inGreen Network in
which it ruled that EU secondary law may also pre-empt administrative
authorities of the Member States from concluding agreements with third
country counterparts.100
In terms of the principle of conferral and the non-delegation doctrine,
increased attention on the part of the legislature to link any external action by
the agency with its internal mandate may also be noted. A new standard
provision here seems to be that an agency will develop such external action
only “in so far is necessary to achieve the objectives of ” its establishing
regulation.101 In the case of Frontex, Europol and Eurojust the threshold is
arguably put higher because it requires the agencies’ external activities to be
necessary for “the fulfilment of [their] tasks.”102 Similarly to the new Frontex
regulation, the new ERA regulation even prescribes the finality of the working
arrangements which the agencies may conclude.103 Arguably then, if the
agency cannot show that its working arrangements further the objectives as
prescribed by its establishing regulation, it is acting ultra vires.
Finally there are the provisions on the control exercised by the EU
institutions. These provisions again illustrate how the questions of
99. See Arts. 33 of the ESAs regulations (1093/2010; 1094/2010; 1095/2010); Art. 19 of
the wholesale energy market regulation (1227/2011); Art. 44(2) of the new ERA regulation
(2016/796).
100. See Case C-66/13, Green Network, EU:C:2014:2399.
101. Art. 19 of the wholesale energy market regulation (1227/2011); Art. 44(1) of the new
ERA regulation (2016/796); Art. 30(1) of the new EU-OSHA regulation (2019/126); Art. 30(1)
of the new Eurofound regulation (2019/127); Art. 29(1) of the new Cedefop regulation
(2019/128). Art. 39(1) of the 2017 ENISA proposal. However, the new EASA regulation lacks
this provision.
102. See Art. 54(1) of (the 2016) Frontex regulation 2016/1624 (Arts.72 in conjunction
with 74 of the 2019 Frontex Regulation); Art. 23(1) of the Europol regulation; Art. 47(1) of the
Eurojust regulation.
103. In the case of the ERA this is “in order to keep up with scientific and technical
developments and to ensure promotion of the Union railways legislation and standards”; in the
case of Frontex, this is “to promote European border management and return standards”. See
Art. 54(1) of the 2016 Frontex regulation (Art. 72 of the 2019 Frontex Regulation) and Art.
44(1) of the new ERA regulation.
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institutional balance and non-delegation cannot be equated with each other.
After all, by prescribing that agencies cannot act on behalf of the EU or bind
the EU, and by instructing agencies to assist the EU institutions, the
prerogatives of the EU institutions under the institutional balance appear
adequately safeguarded.Yet, the fact that the EU agencies must be subject to a
sufficient measure of control, even if they act on their own behalf, explains
why further provisions setting out the ex ante and ongoing control by the EU
institutions of external agency action are also necessary. Here too, legislative
practice seems in flux where political control is mainly channelled through the
Commission104 although the precise degree of control does not seem aligned
to the political sensitivity of the external action in question.
The recently adopted (revised) establishing acts of a number of EU agencies
are illustrative in this regard. Under the old CEPOL and EASA establishing
acts, these agencies could conclude working arrangements with third country
counterparts but only following the Council’s (CEPOL) or Commission’s
(EASA) approval. Under the recast establishing acts, this has been changed
into a (mere) Commission opinion on the draft arrangements.105 Especially
for the EASA, this is remarkable, since the Commission had proposed to
retain the existing requirement.106 For Eurojust, the Commission is not
involved in the conclusion of individual working arrangements, but the latter
must be foreseen in Eurojust’s “four year cooperation strategy” which is
drawn up in consultation with the Commission.107 The recently established
European Public Prosecutor may conclude working arrangements with third
countries without any involvement of the Commission whatsoever.108 In
contrast, for Frontex, the requirement of a Commission opinion on its working
arrangements in its old establishing regulation has been upgraded to prior
104. Note however that in the 2016 Europol regulation, no concrete involvement of the
Commission in the conclusion of working arrangements is foreseen.
105. See Art. 34(5) of the CEPOL regulation; Art. 90(2) of the new EASA regulation; see
also Art. 44(2) of the new ERA regulation. It should be noted that in the case of CEPOL the
Council also retains control because CEPOL can only conclude arrangements with countries
with which the EU itself has concluded a cooperation agreement.
106. Remarkably, this requirement was removed at the suggestion of the European
Parliament, see the four column trilogue document NEGO_CT(2015)0277(2017-09-26) at p.
384. In light of this, it will be interesting to see what happens to the Commission’s proposal for
the new EASO and ENISA regulations in which it also proposed a requirement of Commission
approval. See Art. 35(2) of the EASO proposal (COM(2016)271 final); Art. 39(3) of the
ENISA proposal (COM(2017)477 final). While asylum issues are also politically sensitive, the
envisaged cooperation would be limited to promote the EU’s standards and to promote capacity
building which might not warrant the (heavy) requirement of Commission approval. See Art.
35(2) in COM(2016)271 final.
107. See Art. 52(1) of the Eurojust regulation.
108. See Art. 99(3) in conjunction with Art. 104(1) of the EPPO regulation.
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Commission approval in the new regulation.109 In light of the political
sensitivity of the respective areas concerned (air safety and police training
versus cooperation between border guards) this greater degree of control
indeed seems appropriate. However, in 2019 the establishing acts of the three
agencies active in the area of social policy were also recast. While these
agencies have only very modest mandates, a fortiori resulting in limited
external action that will not be politically salient, the Commission’s approval
of their working arrangements with third country counterparts is
prescribed.110
Finally, the Frontex regulation and the proposal for a recast EASO
regulation foresee a role for the Parliament in that it needs to be kept fully
informed of the working arrangements concluded by the agencies.111 In the
trilogues on the new Frontex regulation, Parliament even succeeded in
ensuring that working arrangements concluded with third countries (but not
those with international organizations) must be sent to the Parliament before
their conclusion.112 Whether this parliamentary control requirement, similar
to that in Article 218(10) TFEU, should be generalized to all agencies, rather
than some of those operating in the AFSJ, depends on whether one envisages
a genuinely parliamentary system for the EU. In any event, it seems something
of an anomaly that a similar requirement is not foreseen for agencies like
Europol, Eurojust and the EPPO.
4.4. The individual working arrangements between the partner
Commission DGs and their agencies
As noted above, the Common Approach requires the agencies to conclude
working arrangements with their partner DGs113 at the Commission. This
requirement seems to reflect a concern for both ex ante control and a means to
safeguard the institutional balance. This is confirmed in the Commission’s
2016 proposal for a recast ACER regulation, in which it foresees that “[t]he
Commission shall ensure that the Agency operates within its mandate and the
existing institutional framework by concluding an appropriate working
109. See Arts. 52(2) and 54(2) of the 2016 Frontex regulation.
110. See Art. 30(1) of the new EU-OSHA regulation (2019/126); Art. 30(1) of the new
Eurofound regulation (2019/127); Art. 29(1) of the new Cedefop regulation (2019/128).
111. See Arts. 52(2) and 54(2) of the 2016 Frontex regulation; Art. 35(2) of the
Commission’s EASO proposal COM(2016)271 final.
112. See the four column document of 20 June 2016 (NEGO_CT(2015)0310), p. 218.
113. On the more than semantic difference between the notions of “parent DG” and “partner
DG”, see Trondal, “The rise of independent supranational administration: The case of the
European Union administration” in Trondal (Ed.), The Rise of Common Political Order –
Institutions, Public Administration and Transnational Space (Edward Elgar, 2017), p. 83.
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arrangement with the Agency’s Director.”114 Depending on the content of the
WAs, it also helps ensure good cooperation between the agency and the
partner DG, putting into effect the duty of cooperation under the institutional
balance. In light of this, it is remarkable that some seven years after the
adoption of the Common Approach, because of recalcitrance on the part of
some EU decentralized agencies, a number of partner DGs have not yet
managed to conclude WAs with their agencies. While the Court does not
require the institutions proper to conclude inter-institutional agreements (in
light of the principle of loyal cooperation),115 this could be different for EU
agencies, since these are subordinate bodies. It could indeed be argued that
agencies are required, under the duty of loyal cooperation limb of the principle
of institutional balance, to conclude such WAs with their partner DGs.
While the responsibility rests on the DGs to conclude the WAs, the
Commission Secretariat General has provided some support to the DGs. As a
result, while a truly consistent approach between DGs is lacking, some
common elements may still be noted. These are the following:
– agencies have no international legal personality;
– agencies lack implied powers to commit the EU;
– agencies’ external activities should be in line with their mandate and
the EU institutional framework;
– agencies’ external relations should be in line with the EU’s priorities
and be in line with EU legislation and policies;
– agencies can never officially represent the EU to the outside world;
– agency officials may participate in EU delegations but only if the head
of the delegation (Commission or High Representative) finds this
useful;
– agencies must consult the Commission before engaging in any external
action.
Provisions that may commonly be found, although not in a majority of
working arrangements are:
– a requirement to copy the partner DG in all formal correspondence
with third countries’ authorities;
– a requirement that the agencies’ external action should have added
value and that the external action should be proportionate to the
agency’s core task;
– the possibility (or obligation) of the partner DG to provide guidance to
the agency on how to interpret its mandate.
114. See Art. 43(3) of the Commission’s proposal, COM(2016)863 final. Similarly, see
Art. 39(3) of the 2017 ENISA proposal.
115. See Case C-25/94, Commission v. Council, EU:C:1996:114.
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Finally, on some issues, different working arrangements prescribe different,
sometimes opposite, requirements. For instance, as regards the participation
in EU delegations, a right of the CPVO to sit in UPOV technical meetings and
a possibility even to represent the EU in such meetings is recognized in its
WA.The EMCDDA, CEPOL and EFCA WAs however only acknowledge that
those agencies’ staff members may be technical members of the EU
delegation, but rule out that they be formal members thereof. The EMA,
CPVO and ECHA WAs also provide that the head of the delegation may allow
the agency to take the floor on behalf of the EU. The WAs of the ESAs even
recognize that the Commission and the ESAs may participate in international
fora independently from each other.
As regards liaising with the EEAS, the EASO may do so directly under its
WA, while the EMCDDA must first go to its partner DG before liaising with
the EEAS. Other agencies such as the EIGE, CEPOL, Eurofound, EU-OSHA,
Cedefop, EFCA, ECHA and ENISA are barred from doing so entirely, as all
communication with the EEAS must go through the partner DG.
4.5. A positive law framework that is fragmented and which insufficiently
reflects relevant constitutional principles
If the non-binding Common Approach and the working arrangements
(together with the establishing acts) can be qualified as composing the
positive law framework governing the EU agencies’ external action, it is clear
that all relevant constitutional requirements identified in section 3 can be
retraced therein at least in some way. It is equally clear, however, that the
legislature and the Commission have not been sufficiently consistent in
translating general constitutional principles into concrete rules framing EU
agencies’ external action: the resulting framework is fragmented and
composed of binding and non-binding texts. In addition, it is differentiated,
since the precise requirements vary from one agency to the next. While some
differentiation between agencies is useful, a common denominator of
elements also seems necessary.116 Similar to other agency governance
116. In this regard, bad differentiation e.g. relates to whether EU agencies have
international legal personality, the requirement that agency external action should be coherent
to the external policy of the EU; information requirements vis-à-vis the EEAS and European
Parliament, etc.; issues where differentiation is useful are e.g. the instruments with (and degree
to) which agencies can act externally, the precise working relations with the Commission DGs
and EEAS, the intensity of control exercised by political actors (as a function of the degree to
which agencies are externally active and e.g. in function of the sensitivity of the area in which
the agency acts), etc.
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issues,117 a convergence in the provisions typically found in the establishing
acts may be noted following the adoption of the Common Approach, but given
that the latter is non-binding and incomplete, unjustifiable discrepancies
between the different agencies remain (see above).118
If this diagnosis is relatively straightforward, the remedy is far from that. As
with most agency governance issues,119 addressing the question of what the
framework governing the agencies’ external relations should look like
requires the institutions and Member States to address a more fundamental
question, namely: what is the role and place of EU decentralized agencies in
the EU’s institutional set-up? Should EU agencies be genuinely independent
or rather subordinate executive bodies? What is their precise relationship with
or position vis-à-vis the Commission, Parliament, Council and Member
States? In a spirit of constructive ambiguity, these questions have remained
unsolved in agencification, since addressing them would have resulted in a
decisional stalemate. Given, though, that all relevant actors involved agree
that there is a concrete policy need for greater expertise to support policy
development and greater coherence in implementation, the discussion on the
more abstract institutional questions is “kicked down the road”.
Today, there is no political appetite and therefore no realistic prospect that
a common understanding on the above questions might be reached. Indeed,
even with regard to the revision of the non-binding Common Approach, only
the Parliament has shown some interest.120 Still, such a revision would be the
most realistic intermediate step before a common understanding on the
agencies’ role and place in the EU’s institutional set-up may be reached.121
Pursuant to such a revision, the institutions could further flesh out the existing
provisions in greater detail. In addition, the common denominator of the
117. See Chamon, “Transparency and accountability of EU decentralized agencies and
agencification in light of the Common Approach on EU decentralized agencies” in Garben,
Govaere and Nimitz (Eds.), Critical Reflections on Constitutional Democracy in the European
Union (Hart, 2019), pp. 245–266.
118. The most pressing of these discrepancies would seem that the possibility for external
action is not recognized for all EU agencies, that the role of the EU institutions proper (as
defined in the establishing regulations) varies greatly, and that something as crucial as the
international legal personality is not only regulated in mere non-binding working
arrangements, but that not all agencies have even concluded such working arrangements with
their partner DGs. As section 5 shows, agencies such as EMSA and EASA (but also Frontex),
which are very active externally, are among those that have not concluded such working
arrangements.
119. See Chamon, op. cit. supra note 117.
120. See e.g. point 7 of the Resolution of the European Parliament of 14 Feb. 2019 on the
implementation of the legal provisions and the Joint Statement ensuring parliamentary scrutiny
over decentralized agencies.
121. Less realistic alternatives to an inter-institutional agreement are an amendment of the
Treaties or a legislative act adopted pursuant to Art. 352 TFEU.
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working arrangements could also be incorporated in the Common Approach.
Indeed, it should be stressed again here that it is remarkable that a crucial issue
such as the international legal personality of EU agencies is left to be regulated
in obscure working arrangements. Similarly, the requirement to be found in
most WAs prescribing that agencies should respect the EU’s priorities and
should act in line with the EU’s policies and legislation should be codified in
a recast Common Approach, since that requirement is equally in line with
Article 21(3) TEU which prescribes that “[t]he Union shall ensure
consistency between the different areas of its external action and between
these and its other policies”. Modest progress can therefore still be made in
simplifying, strengthening and rationalizing the positive law framework
governing EU agencies’ external relations. This would benefit coherence and
transparency even without requiring the political institutions and the Member
States to address the thorny question of the precise position, role and function
of EU agencies, a question which the Common Approach explicitly raised but
did not answer.
As in the case of the constitutional framework above, a final question here
is whether and how the positive law framework identified in the present
section can be enforced against the EU agencies. Just like for the
constitutional framework, this will be a matter for the privileged applicants,
where the Court may be expected to be lenient on the admissibility of such
actions even when non-binding arrangements are challenged. Whether
non-binding documents such as the Common Approach and the working
arrangements could be invoked to show the illegality of an agreement or
arrangement concluded by an agency is a different matter. While agencies
could be said to have bound themselves by agreeing to a working arrangement
with their partner DG,122 a similar construction could not be relied upon for
requirements flowing from the Common Approach. Instead the relevant
provisions of the establishing acts or working arrangements could be read in
light of the Common Approach, making the latter enforceable. Again, all this
will be different for private parties, given the strict standing requirements
applicable to them. In addition, a further hurdle for private parties (assuming
that the admissibility hurdle is passed) would be that it is doubtful whether
they could even invoke a violation of a procedural provision (such as the one
prescribing the Commission’s consent or opinion).123
122. By analogy, see inter alia Case C-167/04 P, JCB Service v. Commission, EU:C:
2006:594, paras. 207–209.
123. In Tilly-Sabco A.G. Wahl suggested that private applicants could not invoke such
procedural provisions unless the rule amounts to an essential procedural requirement intended
to guarantee legal certainty. The ECJ did not address the issue of whether private parties can
invoke such rules of procedure, but simply examined the alleged infringement of its own
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5. Administrative agreements or arrangements concluded by the
EU agencies
Finally, it is useful to look into some of the actual arrangements which EU
decentralized agencies have concluded with international counterparts to see
whether they conform to both the constitutional law framework and the
positive law framework identified above. It is also relevant to ascertain
whether there is any empirical proof of the agencies’ capacity to act
internationally, which may be implied in their establishing acts (see above) but
could also be deduced from their practice and especially from the recognition
of their international personality by States.124 The four arrangements that are
looked into are: the Service Level Agreement concluded by the European
Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) with its Norwegian counterpart; the
working arrangement concluded by EASA with its Ukrainian counterpart; the
Cooperation Agreement between EMSA and Eurocontrol; and the
Memorandum of Cooperation between EFSA and its Japanese counterpart.125
These four arrangements will be scrutinized to determine (i) whether the
constitutional and positive law frameworks identified above have been
respected and (ii) whether the agencies’ practice indicates a recognition of
their international legal personality.
5.1. EMSA’s SLA with the Norwegian Coastal Administration
In 2016, the EMSA concluded a Service Level Agreement (SLA) with the
Norwegian Coastal Administration in relation to the hosting, maintenance and
operation of IT servers for the SafeSeaNet project. The EMSA’s competence
to conclude such SLAs implicitly flows from Directive 2002/59, which tasks
the EMSA with the technical implementation of SafeSeaNet. EMSA has
several such SLAs (with other EU agencies and with national authorities of
the Member States) but the remarkable issue here, of course, is that the
agreement in question is concluded with a third country authority. In terms of
legal basis, a problematic issue is that the EMSA regulation itself only
motion. See Opinion of A.G. Wahl in Case C-183/16 P, Tilly Sabco v. Commission,
EU:C:2017:348, para 56; Case C-183/16 P, Tilly Sabco v. Commission, EU:C:2017:704, para
116. In Common Market Fertilizers, the Court ruled that such rules cannot be involved by
private parties in so far they (merely) ensure the internal working of committees (or in this case
agencies). See Case C-443/05 P. CMF SA v. Commission, EU:C:2007:511, para 144.
124. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 398.
125. These documents represent a variety of constellations, involving both third countries
and international organizations as counterparts, agencies with and without dedicated working
arrangements with their partner DG, binding and non-binding documents, etc.
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provides for the conclusion of arrangements by EMSA, not agreements.126 At
the same time, no prerogatives of the EU institutions seem affected and the
very technical nature of the agreement would pass Short-selling’s test that the
agency has to act on predefined criteria (which annex III of Directive 2002/59
provides). In addition, under EMSA’s regulation the Executive Director has to
submit arrangements to the Board, on which the Commission has
representatives, which can object within four weeks.127 If this procedure is
respected, this might also satisfy the Short-selling requirement that the agency
cannot act completely autonomously. Yet, unlike EMSA’s agreement with
Eurocontrol (see further below) this procedure is not referred to in the SLA.
Indeed, this specific SLA was not submitted to the Board,128 while two other
similar SLAs were presented to the Board pursuant to Article 15(2)(ba) of the
EMSA Regulation.129 The first concerned an agreement for the hosting,
maintenance and operation of the North Atlantic AIS Regional Server and its
connection with SafeSeaNet, again with EMSA’s Norwegian counterpart
while the other was concluded with the Maritime Analysis and Operations
Centre – Narcotics, a body established through an international agreement
concluded between 7 EU Member States but partially funded by the EU.130
EMSA’s practice, therefore, is incoherent and dubious under its own
Regulation.
In addition, it could be questioned whether EMSA necessarily needs to
conclude agreements with third country authorities to host SafeSeaNet. Since
EMSA is one of those agencies which has not concluded a WA with its partner
DG, the SLA cannot be reviewed in light of this. Of course, that a WA is still
forthcoming some 7 years after the adoption of the Common Approach itself
raises the question whether the EMSA has not breached the duty of loyal
cooperation vis-à-vis the Commission, as discussed above.
On the binding nature of the agreement itself, there can be no doubt. The
agreement refers to “the Parties”, employs “shall” throughout, lists specific
obligations and contains clauses on entry into force, termination and dispute
settlement, etc. Overall, however, it resembles more of a commercial contract
since the Norwegian authority agrees to provide a service in return for
financial remuneration. In this regard, it is especially remarkable that both
parties agreed that their agreement is governed by “European Union Law”
(whatever that may mean in practice) and that the ECJ has exclusive
126. See Art. 15(2)(ba) of the EMSA Regulation.
127. Ibid.
128. As confirmed following a request for access to documents, on file with the author.
129. See written procedures 05/2014 and 06/2014, on file with the author.
130. For the text of this agreement, in Dutch and English, see <zoek.officielebekend
makingen.nl/trb-2007-231.html>.
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jurisdiction in case of a dispute. Despite the odd constellation, then, it must be
assumed that the EMSA has merely concluded a private contract.131
5.2. EASA’s SAFA WA with the Ukrainian Aviation Administration
The EASA is perhaps one of the most active EU agencies when it comes to
concluding working arrangements with international counterparts. The type
of arrangements which it concludes are also diverse.132 As a result, the present
discussion of the 2015 SAFA WA concluded with its Ukrainian counterpart is
merely an illustration and should not necessarily be seen as a representative
example of the whole of WAs which the EASA concludes. The acronym
SAFA stands for Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircrafts, a programme which
the EASA inherited from the European Civil Aviation Conference. Today it
forms part of the EU Ramp Inspection Programme, allowing ramp inspections
of foreign aircraft. The operational management of the programme has been
left by the Commission to the EASA. Because the programme includes
non-EU Member States “the pan-European dimension of the programme, has
been assured through the signature of a Working Arrangement
between … these individual States and EASA.”133
In terms of legal basis, the operational management of the original SAFA
programme was entrusted to the EASA by the Commission in its Regulation
768/2006,134 implementing Directive 2004/36.135 The current Ramp
Inspection Programme is foreseen in Commission Regulation 965/2012. Both
instruments provide that the EASA:
“shall manage and operate the tools and procedures necessary for the
collection and exchange of … the information provided by third countries
or international organizations with whom appropriate agreements have
been concluded with the EU, or organizations with whom the Agency has
131. See in this vein Reuter, Introduction au droit des traités (Presses Universitaires de
France, 1985), p. 37.
132. For a discussion, see Coman-Kund, op. cit. supra note 12, pp. 210–243.
133. See Report from the Commission on the European Community SAFA Programme,
O.J. 2008, C 231/1.As noted by Coman-Kund, the second generation of SAFA WAs (from 2011
onwards) have been concluded also with non-European counterparts. See Coman-Kund, op. cit.
supra note 12, p. 213.
134. See O.J. 2006, L 134/16.
135. See O.J. 2004, L 143/76. Given the Commission’s broad discretion when adopting
measures implementing formal legislation, the decision to “outsource” the management of
SAFA to the EASA does not seem problematic. For the relevant standard as elaborated by the
Court to assess the Commission’s implementing power under Art. 291 TFEU, see Case
C-65/13, Parliament v. Commission, EU:C:2014:2289, paras. 44–45.
CML Rev. 20191540 Chamon
concluded appropriate arrangements in accordance with [Article 90(2) of
the EASA Regulation]”.136
In terms of conferral, therefore, this legal basis is problematic since for the
integration of third countries in the programme a proper agreement under
Article 218 TFEU seems required, WAs only being foreseen for international
organizations.137 On the other hand, in terms of institutional balance, the WA
seems unproblematic as it does not prima facie infringe on either the
Commission’s or the Council’s prerogatives and neither does it frustrate these
institutions in exercising their prerogatives. Like the guidelines of the
Commission at issue in France v. Commission II they were not adopted in a
vacuum and the Commission was kept informed and even had to consent to
them.138 As a result, the Short-selling requirements are thereby also met, since
the EASA is effectively tasked to manage certain technicalities of the
programme according to criteria pre-defined in the Commission’s
regulations.
However, despite its qualification as a WA, the arrangement concluded
with the Ukrainian authority actually appears from its wording to be an
agreement,139 since it inter alia refers to the “Parties” which “have agreed as
follows”. It also uses “shall” throughout and provides that the parties “agree
to” cooperate in a specific manner. It furthermore contains provisions on entry
into force and termination and the possible suspension in case of a persistent
failure to comply. The actual text of the WA suggests that the EASA has
entered into binding commitments under international law, since the WA
cannot in any event be qualified as a contract (like the EMSA SLA),
something which fall outside its mandate. The EASA is one of the agencies
(like the EMSA) which has not concluded a WA with its partner DG. As a
result, there is no document that explicitly excludes an international legal
personality of the agency. At the same time, the current EASA regulation
136. See Art. 2 of Regulation 768/2006; Annex II, Subpart Ops, Section II,
ARO.RAMP.150(a)(2) of Regulation 965/2012.
137. The EU and Ukraine have not concluded a Common Aviation Area agreement yet,
although they are working towards one. See e.g. EEAS, EU launches new aviation safety
project in Ukraine, Press Release 190315_6.
138. In France v. Commission II the Court noted that “both the Transatlantic Economic
Partnership and the Action Plan were approved by the Council, as is made clear in the
memorandum of 9 April 2002 sent by the Commission to the committee set up pursuant to
Article 133(3) EC, and the committee was regularly informed of the progress of the
negotiations relating to the drafting of the Guidelines by the Commission’s services.” See Case
C-233/02, France v. Commission II, para 41.
139. Coman-Kund, following an extensive analysis, also concludes that the EASA’s SAFA
WAs “feature legally binding provisions”. See Coman-Kund, op. cit. supra note 12, p. 239.
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provides that EASA WAs cannot bind the EU or its Member States.140 It
would thus appear that it is the EASA that has committed itself. Under the
2008 EASA Regulation (which was applicable at the time of the conclusion of
the WA) one could argue that the WA could still be imputed to the
Commission,141 since it had given its prior approval to the WA, but the current
Regulation has changed this into a mere prior consultation. While the latter
requirement would still conform to the Short-selling requirements, it is clearly
insufficient to safeguard the prerogatives of the institutions proper under the
institutional balance if Ukraine were to hold the EU internationally
responsible for the binding SAFA. Especially under the new 2018 EASA
Regulation, then, EASA working arrangements that actually appear to be
agreements, such as the one with its Ukrainian counterpart, will become
legally problematic.142
5.3. EMSA’s Cooperation Agreement with Eurocontrol
The EMSA relies on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) to perform
surveillance functions under its mandate. To ensure safe use, the airspace used
by RPAS is segregated from the airspace used by other users, at the cost of
flexibility for all airspace users. Projects have therefore been set up to allow
RPAS to fly in non-segregated airspace. To this end, EMSA (as an RPAS user)
entered into an agreement with the Air Traffic Manager, Eurocontrol. The
agreement establishes a (modest) “framework for cooperation to facilitate
EMSA’s RPAS into non-segregated airspace and to draw general lessons from
this experience”. The language used in the agreement suggests an intention to
be bound: it includes terms such as “the Parties”, “have agreed as follows”; the
Parties “will” or “shall”. There is also a separate clause on dispute settlement
(including an obligation to resort to arbitration) and specific clauses on
duration (indefinite) and termination.
Unlike EMSA’s SLA discussed in section 5.1, the cooperation agreement
does refer to Article 15(2)(ba) of the EMSA Regulation which allows the
Director to conclude “administrative arrangements” with “other bodies
140. It should be noted that the 2008 Regulation did not provide that the EASA could not
bind the EU or the Member States, but the non-binding Common Approach of 2012 provided
so in a general manner for all EU agencies (cf. supra).
141. This would then of course raise the question whether the Commission had violated the
Council’s prerogatives under Art. 218 TFEU, in light of France v. Commission II (cf. supra), or
whether instead, by adopting Directive 2004/36, the Council had legitimately conferred this
power on the Commission.
142. Indeed, under the 2008 EASA Regulation, Coman-Kund concluded, largely because of
the Commission’s power of approval, that EASA could not be considered to be “an independent
entity on the international plane”. See Coman-Kund, op. cit. supra note 12, p. 245.
CML Rev. 20191542 Chamon
working in the Agency’s fields of activities”. The regulation thereby
prescribes that such arrangements need to be submitted to the Board which
may object within four weeks. Given that there is no WA between the EMSA
and the Commission, the agreement cannot be assessed in this light. In any
event, the binding cooperation agreement appears legally problematic, since it
is not a non-binding arrangement (as foreseen in the EMSA Regulation). If it
is to be deduced from the other WAs (between the Commission and the other
agencies) that the EMSA also lacks international legal personality, its
conclusion of a cooperation agreement definitely appears legally
questionable. In terms of delegation, the agreement does seem a suitable and
even necessary measure for the EMSA to realize its mission and tasks as
pre-defined in the EMSA regulation. The Commission’s presence on the
EMSA Board further ensures that the agency cannot act fully autonomously.
Whether the institutional balance sensu stricto is affected is unclear. One
could argue that since EMSA respects the requirements of France v.
Commission II143 and as long as it respects the Common Approach and is not
seen as acting on behalf of the EU, the prerogatives of the institutions remain
intact. Yet this thus depends on how the agreement is perceived by EMSA’s
counterparts and whether they would hold the EU responsible, under
international law, for any breaches of the agreement.As far as the Commission
is concerned, the fact that it holds only four votes on the Management Board
means that it cannot force the Board to object to a proposed administrative
arrangement under Article 15(2)(ba) of the EMSA Regulation unless one
takes the view that the early warning mechanism gives sufficient control to the
Commission over the Board’s dealings.144
5.4. EFSA’s Memorandum of Cooperation with the Food Safety
Commission of Japan
The EFSA first concluded a Memorandum of Cooperation with its Japanese
counterpart (FSCJ) in 2009. In 2015 this memorandum was renewed and
elaborated. It provides that its purpose is to “enhance the scientific
cooperation and dialogue between EFSA and FSCJ” and emphasizes both that
it “does not imply any legal obligations” and “does not intend to compromise
EFSA’s and FSCJ’s ability to carry out their respective responsibilities neither
does it intend to create any legal rights or obligations”. Concretely the
Memorandum foresees in mutual support on issues such as information
exchange, sharing of expertise, capacity building, training and visits. This is
143. See supra note 138.
144. See para 59 of the Common Approach. Under the mechanism, the Management Board
is under no formal obligation to act upon the Commission’s reservations.
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done in respect of the existing (internal) legislative frameworks applicable to
both the EFSA and FSCJ, meaning that the memorandum itself does not create
a legal basis for information exchange for example. The language used (“the
organizations” rather than “the parties”, “intend to”, “may”) further points to
the soft law character of the memorandum.
In terms of form and substance, then, the memorandum complies with the
positive law framework identified above. In this regard it may be noted that
unlike the EMSA and EASA, the EFSA does have a WA with its partner DG.
The purpose and content of the memorandum with the FSCJ appear in line
with that WA.145 Since the EFSA has not impinged on one of the institutions’
prerogatives by concluding the memorandum and the (limited) cooperation
set up with the FSCJ appears suitable for the EFSA to achieve its missions, no
legal objections can be formulated against this type of administrative working
arrangements.
5.5. Agencies’ administrative agreements, an assessment
The possibility for EU agencies to liaise with international counterparts
immediately raises the problematic position of “administrative agreements” in
international law. In sections 3 and 4 it was already established that EU
agencies cannot in any event commit the EU, and that EU agencies seem to
lack an international legal personality of their own to commit themselves
under international law. Four working arrangements were looked at, to
determine: (i) whether in adopting these arrangements the agency in question
respected both the constitutional and the positive law frameworks identified in
sections 3 and 4; and (ii) whether the actual working arrangements may shed
a different light on the question of the agencies’ international legal
personality. After all, if arrangements concluded by EU agencies are found to
be binding, they may indicate a recognition on the side of the EU’s partners
that the EU agency enjoys international legal personality.
On this first point, the key issue was to distinguish those texts in which the
authors commit themselves (binding, agreements) from those in which they
simply declare their intentions (non-binding, arrangements). For this, the
language relied on is indicative.146 Indeed, under international law the nature
(legal or political) of such a text depends on “its actual terms and [on] the
particular circumstances in which it was drawn up”.147 Applying this to the
145. See European Commission, Guidance note for EFSA’s international activity (on file
with the author).
146. Virally, op. cit. supra note 24, pp. 227–228.
147. ICJ, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case,Greece v. Turkey, Judgment of 19 Dec. 1978,
para 96.
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selected cases, it was revealing to find that only the EFSA’s memorandum
was an actual arrangement, the other texts showing the parties’ intention to be
bound. Leaving aside EMSA’s SLA, which should be qualified as a
commercial contract, this means that the agreements concluded by EMSA and
EASA may be problematic if the reference to “arrangements” in their
establishing acts is to be read as allowing only for non-binding agreements.
Given that these two agencies do not have a WA with their partner DG – in
itself quite remarkable since it is precisely these agencies that have been
prolific in their external dealings,148 there are no WAs in the light of which
those establishing acts may be read. Do these “agreements” concluded by the
EMSA and EASA amount to a practice that indicates a recognition of their
international legal personality?This is difficult to argue for the EASA since its
SAFA WA is not concluded with the Ukrainian State itself; but EMSA did
conclude an agreement with Eurocontrol – an international organization with
legal personality. Of course, the practice of the actual implementation of these
“agreements” will shed further light on this question, but that falls outside the
scope of this contribution.
Yet, even if the notion of arrangements is to be read in its generic meaning,
rather than in line with the Commission’s post-Lisbon practice,149 with the
result that both agreements are not problematic under the positive law
framework, legal issues remain under the constitutional framework identified
in section 3. After all, the positive law framework does not fully and properly
reflect the constitutional framework. This is especially clear when the
EMSA’s agreement with Eurocontrol is compared to the EASA’s SAFA with
its Ukrainian counterpart. While both could be said to respect the
non-delegation doctrine flowing from Short-selling, apart from the fact that
only arrangements are explicitly foreseen in the establishing acts, the fact that
the Commission had to agree to the SAFA arguably gave sufficient means to
that institution to safeguard its prerogatives. For EMSA’s agreement,
however, the procedure prescribed in the establishing regulation only grants a
comparable power to the Management Board. Similarly, any new SAFAs
which EASA would conclude no longer require Commission approval, raising
the problem of a violation of the Commission’s prerogatives if EASA is seen
to act on behalf of the EU.
148. As noted above, the EFSA Memorandum is legally unproblematic, while EFSA has a
WA with its partner DG. Similarly, the EFCA has the strictest WA with its partner DG, but has
not even concluded any WA with external actors (as confirmed by the agency in an email dated
7 May 2019, on file with the author). The WA for the EFCA is arguably the strictest because it
is the only one that refers to Art. 17 TEU, noting that “without a specific mandate given by the
Commission, EU agencies are not entitled to exert any external activity”.
149. Cf. supra note 19.
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6. Conclusion
As with most governance issues in EU agencification, the EU legislature has
not developed a uniform approach towards the possibility for the EU agencies
to conclude working arrangements with third country and international
counterparts. The Common Approach on Decentralized Agencies sets out a
number of principles, but it is a non-binding IIA which has not been duly
implemented by the EU legislature. Specifically for the EU agencies’ external
relations, the deficiency in the implementation of the Common Approach is
clear in the lack of WAs concluded between agencies such as Frontex, EASA
and EMSA and their partner DGs, despite the first two of these agencies
probably being the most prolific of all in pursuing external relations.
An analysis of the positive law framework governing the EU agencies’
external relations (composed of the relevant establishing acts, the Common
Approach and any applicable WAs with partner DGs) reveals that it only
partially and in a fragmented manner reflects the constitutional principles
which ought to govern the agencies’ external action. The present article
further shows how these constitutional principles can be narrowed down to the
principle of institutional balance (construed broadly) and theMeroni doctrine
as re-interpreted in Short-selling.
Under the constitutional framework thus identified, agencies may develop
external relations as long as this is explicitly allowed under their establishing
regulations (or other legislation) and as long as they respect the (negative)
obligation not to infringe on the prerogatives of the institutions proper and the
(positive) obligation to allow those institutions to exercise these prerogatives.
If those conditions are met, the agencies may be empowered to act on the
external plane insofar as necessary to fulfil their internal mandate and insofar
as the EU legislature (or the Commission) sets out the criteria governing this
external action in advance. The agency may then only implement this external
action following approval of or in consultation with other actors, such as for
example the Council or Commission.
If these conditions are met, it would in principle be possible for the EU
agencies to conclude binding international agreements either on their own
behalf or on behalf of the EU. However, the EU institutions have pre-empted
the latter possibility in the Common Approach by making clear that agencies
can never represent or bind the EU. Of the WAs in place between partner DGs
and their agencies, most also rule out the possibility for an agency to acquire
international legal personality, meaning that those agencies cannot commit
themselves under international law either.
The resulting legal situation is unsatisfactory: the applicable positive law
framework is fragmented since it is a mosaic to be reconstructed from
CML Rev. 20191546 Chamon
different texts. This fragmentation then results in differentiation since
different texts apply to different agencies. The framework is furthermore also
crippled because some of these texts are non-binding (Common Approach,
agency-partner DG working arrangements) and it is incomplete because it
does not properly reflect the constitutional framework as identified in section
3 above. This is politically and legally problematic since it results in
ambiguity, which facilitates “agency loss”. Without a proper framework, it is
difficult to hold either EU agencies or the EU institutions to account for the
external action of the EU agencies.
Applying both the constitutional and the positive law frameworks to some
of the texts concluded by EU agencies with international counterparts, reveals
that some are in fact unproblematic because they are non-binding cooperation
instruments or because they are binding but merely amount to a commercial
contract. A third case identified revealed the existence of WAs which pose
greater legal problems. Despite being qualified as an arrangement, the SAFA
WA which EASA concluded with its Ukrainian counterpart appears to be a
binding agreement, the legal basis of which is lacking. “Agreements” like the
SAFA WA might indicate a practice of the EASA concluding international
agreements. Whereas the legal fiction of imputing such an agreement to the
Commission (and from the Commission to the EU) could be applied under the
2008 EASA Regulation, this appears impossible under the 2018 EASA
Regulation.
While no appetite exists among the institutions, apart from the European
Parliament, to revisit the Common Approach, this study on the EU
decentralized agencies’ external relations reveals how a binding IIA on
decentralized agencies’ governance has become acutely necessary. The
current fragmented ad hoc approach appears detrimental to legal certainty
and, because there is still no clear consensus on the role and place of EU
agencies in the EU’s institutional set-up, no elegant (i.e. a sufficient but not
burdensome) control regime is in place for agencies. As a minimum then, EU
agencies themselves should be more careful and avoid concluding agreements
where they are only empowered under their mandate to conclude
arrangements.
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